Analysis Of A P By John Updike - 731 Words

In â€Å"AP†, John Updike uses compelling diction, language, and description to enhance the perspective of Sammy within the story and his final decision to quit his job. The use of imagery within the supermarket develops the environment Sammy worked in to a greater extent and painted diverse pictures of the customers. The derogatory descriptions of Lengel and some customers was also significant in terms of revealing Sammy’s emotions about his job at AP. The nature of the situation with the girls and descriptive language of the customers and environment were also significant factors.A spontaneous effort to portray Sammy’s power and independence was a significant aspect Updike made more interesting by implementing dialogue, diction, and theme.†¦show more content†¦He saw a potential opportunity to talk to the girls, but the fact that Lengel had made them blush in a negative way had angered him as he felt the embarrassment was unnecessary. The combined frus tration of his environment convinced him to attempt to be the â€Å"hero† and win over the girl’s attention even though it was a failure. Updike writes, â€Å"The girl, and whod blame them, are in a hurry to get out, so I say â€Å"I quit† to Lengel quick enough for them to hear, hoping they’ll stop and watch me, their unsuspected hero.† Later on he continues, â€Å"I look around for my girls, but they’re gone.† Such dialogue hints that his desire to win the girls over was also a minor contribution toward his departure from AP especially when he states, ‘â€Å"You didn’t have to embarrass them.†Ã¢â‚¬â„¢ Sammy’s inability to conform to Lengel’s power and the future AP had in store for him was also well portrayed through the description and diction in the story. The author made it known that achieving a promotion in the AP was not so simple. â€Å"I forgot to say he thinks he’s going to be manag er some sunny day, maybe in 1990 when it’s called the Great Alexandro and Petrooshki Tea Company or something.† Internally Sammy felt that if he had remained in this job he would have been helplessly waiting for a promotion some day. Sammy’s doubtfulness is seen in the words â€Å"thinks† and sarcasm from the words â€Å"maybe in 1990..†Show MoreRelatedJohn Updike aP Analysis1508 Words   |  7 PagesHanks Aamp;P- In John Updikes Aamp;P, choices and consequences are portrayed as a fundamental and recurring theme throughout the story. Many can understand the idea of repercussions for specific decisions and actions, which makes this story very relatable to most audiences. The story encompasses numerous ideologies paramount to human development and philosophy. Dismantling the story can help depict underlain meanings and asses the ambiguous nature of humanity. The construct of Aamp;P portraysRead MoreA P John Updike Analysis856 Words   |  4 PagesIn John Updike’s â€Å"A P†, he expresses the life of a young boy names Sammy, who works in a small food mart named A P. It’s a coming of age story that deals with puberty taking over the better of Sammy and trying to come out the hero when in reality he comes out looking like a fool. There is also one other detail that cause inner and outer conflicts with Sammy that lead to life lessons and the realization that not everyone is happy where they’re at in life, but if you work hard enough, anythingRead MoreAnalysis Of A P By John Updike1324 Words   |  6 PagesNovember 2015 2015 Unavoidable Conflict Sammy is a local cashier in a grocery store called AP who resents the local town and disagrees with the local populous. A strong willed teenager who is more than aware of himself tries to get a firm footing in the town. When this backfires Sammy becomes drastic and hastily makes a decision to try to fix all of the issues. To capture this idea in AP by John Updike, it illustrates the struggles of a young teenage male, where his beliefs are against that ofRead MoreAnalysis Of A P By John Updike845 Words   |  4 Pagesâ€Å"The sheep pushing against the carts down the aisle - the girls were walking against the traffic - were pretty hilarious† (Updike AP). The title of this story is AP, written by John Updike. The main characters shown in this story are Sammy, The Three Girls, Lengel, and Stokesie. Here’s a brief summary, â€Å"Three girls walk into AP wearing bikinis. Sammy’s constantly looks at â€Å"Queenie†, the group leader. Stokesie joins in as Sammy watches the girls go aisle after aisle. As the girls reach to theRead MoreAnalysis Of A P By John Updike1560 Words   |  7 PagesJalen Johnson Ms. Mahaffey Eng 102 10/15/17 Feminism in AP In the story â€Å"AP† by John Updike he tries to portray the conventional lifestyle and tendency of his community. The story â€Å"AP† proves how feminism was a large part of the conservative lifestyle and is still present today. AP helps you visualize how sexism could be happening right under our noses. The story is told through the main character Sammy, who is an ordinary teenager in the small town. Sammy makes a courageous effort to fight feminismRead MoreAnalysis of AP by John Updike533 Words   |  2 Pagesâ€Å"AP† (supermarket) is a short story written by the hardworking and highly productive John Updike and narrated in first person by a 19-year-old protagonist and cashier named Sammy. It was published in 1961 and is about Sammy’s change of character and coming of age. Updike uses the various shifts in tone, great attention to detail, and a great deal of symbolism to portray the significant change. The opening sentence â€Å" In walks three girls in nothing but bathing suits† (par.1) sets up the colloquialRead MoreAnalysis Of A P By John Updike895 Words   |  4 Pagesâ€Å"In walks these three girls in nothing but bathing suits† (Updike 1). With the previous quote, would one believe that the storyline is set in a grocery store? In John Updike’s â€Å"AP,† Sammy is the main character. The entire narrative happens through his eyes. Having three out of the ordinary girls walk into the A P mystified Sammy as well as the other men in the store. The tale follows the girls around while they shop and until they leave. It carefully describes what aisles the girls pass throughRead MoreAnalysis Of John Updike s A P 1804 Words   |  8 Pagesit’s seemingly infallibility. Most young people feel invincible, but really it is their naivety and inability to understand the harsh concept of reality that enables this behavior. While a common theme in l iterature, John Updike gives the tale of youth a consumerist spin in â€Å"AP†. Updike tells the story of Sammy the cashier, who see’s himself as superior to those around him and believes he will turn out nothing like the adults he’s surrounded with. He seems to get his chance to be great when some beautifulRead MoreAnalysis Of John Updike s A P1293 Words   |  6 PagesJohn Updike is viewed by his readers as a progressive voice in his work that promotes feminist issues. He makes these issues stand out more evidently, rather than hidden, in order for the reader to realize how women are viewed in society. From reading Updike’s AP, the story sends the message to readers of genders working together to strive for equality. If readers do not carefully and actively read AP they may miss key messages about the power men hold over women, not just in society but in literatureRead MoreAnalysis Of John Updike s A P2577 Words   |  11 Pagescome together and dec lare allegiance to a similar core of beliefs. And, when they do, they ask a particular set of question about a literary work. Each different way of analyzing a literary work elicits a different set of questions. AP, a short story by John Updike, would best be analyzed by using the school of New Criticism and analyzing the journey Sammy, the narrator, experiences throughout the story. The school of New Criticism believes that the work’s overall meaning depends solely on the text

In the Late 1990s a Growing Number of Economists Free Essays

Q. In the late 1990s a growing number of economists argued that world policymakers were focusing too much on fighting inflation. The economists also argued that the technical level of potential output had risen. We will write a custom essay sample on In the Late 1990s a Growing Number of Economists or any similar topic only for you Order Now Show their argument using the AS/AD model. Ans. During the 1970s and the 1980s inflation had risen to relatively higher levels as compared to the earlier decades. The tightening of the monetary policy was one of the action that lead to the fall inflation rate after remaining high for two continuous decades. But economists in the past have argued that there has been too much stress on fighting inflation during 1990s. The prime reasons for this argument is the fact that both fiscal and monetary side, i. e. both the instruments which managed the demand side of the economy where used for curbing inflation at a time when there was a technical boom in the economy in the form of enhancing productivity. This lead to the potential output of the economy to increase and therefore had a favourable impact on efforts to curb inflation. This enhancement of productivity (which was primarily due to decline in prices of computers) during the 1990s especially the later half is the chief factor that lead to the shift of the aggregate supply curve of the economy as shown in the figure. The Aggregate supply curve shifts from AS0 to AS1. This shift is because of the technical progress during the concerned period. The technical progress caused the economy to produce a higher level of produce from the same amount of inputs because of productivity enhancement which caused the prices in the economy to cool off automatically. This is visible in the graph where the aggregate price in the economy falls from P0 to P1. Therefore, the argument made by the economist during this period of unneeded stress being given on fighting inflation is valid from the macroeconomic point by looking at the aggregate demand and supply curve. The shift of the aggregate supply due to technical progress backs up the argument stating the fall in economy real prices in aggregate sense due shift of the supply curve. How to cite In the Late 1990s a Growing Number of Economists, Essay examples

Color Blue free essay sample

Is a peacemaker of color; not many people dislike blue. 3. Is considered a noble color, represents dignity and poise. 4. Dark blue inspires confidence and trust. 5. Pale blue is believed to encourage fantasy. 6. Cool, calm, comfortable, relaxing, and clean. II. Negative associations 7. Depression, cold, low-class, and melancholy. 8. The color blue reduces appetite. 9. People are more unlikely to eat blue food. 10. Time passes by slower in a blue room. III. Culture 11. The color blue is significant in religious beliefs; also believed to bring peace. 12. Certain culture believes that the color blue keeps bad spirits away. 13. In Germany â€Å"I’m blue† means â€Å"I’m drunk. † 14. â€Å"Something blue† bridal tradition in the US represents love. 15. In Iran, blue is the color of mourning. IV. Health 16. Research shows that blue light will slow your heartbeat, decrease your temperature, and relax your muscle. 17. Blue reduces nervousness and excitement. 18. The color blue is known to contract the arteries, veins, and capillaries and thereby raises the blood pressure. We will write a custom essay sample on Color Blue or any similar topic specifically for you Do Not WasteYour Time HIRE WRITER Only 13.90 / page 9 Blue is also known to assist with balance and equilibrium. V. Consumer Behavior 20. Fashion consultants recommend wearing blue to job interviews because it symbolizes loyalty. 21. Weightlifters are able to handle heavier weights in blue gyms. 22. The color blue represents the U. S. democratic party. Beginning with the 2000 presidential elections, states that preferred democratic candidates were referred to as the â€Å"blue state. † 23. Blue is used in emergency rooms to calm patience and family members. 24. People work more productively in blue rooms.

Bonnie Steinbock Speciesism and the Idea of Equality Essay Example

Bonnie Steinbock Speciesism and the Idea of Equality Essay Royal Institute of Philosophy Speciesism and the Idea of Equality Author(s): Bonnie Steinbock Source: Philosophy, Vol. 53, No. 204 (Apr. , 1978), pp. 247-256 Published by: Cambridge University Press on behalf of Royal Institute of Philosophy Stable URL: http://www. jstor. org/stable/3749431 Accessed: 05/08/2010 08:38 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTORs Terms and Conditions of Use, available at http://www. jstor. org/page/info/about/policies/terms. jsp. JSTORs Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use. Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at http://www. jstor. org/action/showPublisher? publisherCode=cup. Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed page of such transmission. We will write a custom essay sample on Bonnie Steinbock Speciesism and the Idea of Equality specifically for you for only $16.38 $13.9/page Order now We will write a custom essay sample on Bonnie Steinbock Speciesism and the Idea of Equality specifically for you FOR ONLY $16.38 $13.9/page Hire Writer We will write a custom essay sample on Bonnie Steinbock Speciesism and the Idea of Equality specifically for you FOR ONLY $16.38 $13.9/page Hire Writer JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [emailprotected] org. Cambridge University Press and Royal Institute of Philosophy are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Philosophy. http://www. jstor. org Speciesism Equality BONNIE STEINBOCK and the Idea of Most of us believe that we are entitled to treat members of other species in ways which would be considered wrong if inflicted on members of our own species. We kill them for food, keep them confined, use them in painful experiments. The moral philosopher has to ask what relevant difference justifies this difference in treatment. A look at this question will lead us to re-examine the distinctions which we have assumed make a moral difference. It has been suggested by Peter Singer1 that our current attitudes are speciesist, a word intended to make one think of racist or sexist. The idea is that membership in a species is in itself not relevant to moral treatment, and that much of our behaviour and attitudes towards non-human animals is based simply on this irrelevant fact. There is, however, an important difference between racism or sexism and speciesism. We do not subject animals to different moral treatment simply because they have fur and feathers, but because they are in fact different from human beings in ways that could be morally relevant. It is false that women are incapable of being benefited by education, and therefore that claim cannot serve to justify preventing them from attending school. But this is not false of cows and dogs, even chimpanzees. Intelligence is thought to be a morally relevant capacity because of its relation to the capacity for moral responsibility. What is Singers response? He agrees that non-human animals lack certain capacities that human animals possess, and that this may justify different treatment. But it does not justify giving less consideration to their needs and interests. According to Singer, the moral mistake which the racist or sexist makes is not essentially the factual error of thinking that blacks or women are inferior to white men. For even if there were no factual error, even if it were true that blacks and women are less intelligent and responsible than whites and men, this would not justify giving less consideration to their needs and interests. It is important to note that the term speciesism is in one way like, and in another way unlike, the terms racism and sexism. What the term speciesism has in common with these terms is the reference to focusing on a characteristic which is, in itself, irrelevant to moral treatment. And it is worth reminding us of this. 1 Peter Singer, AnimalLiberation New York Review Book, I975). (A 53 Philosophy I978 247 Discussion But Singers real aim is to bring us to a new understanding of the idea of equality. The question is, on what do claims to equality rest? The demand for human equality is a demand that the i nterests of all human beings be considered equally, unless there is a moral justification for not doing so. But why should the interests of all human beings be considered equally? In order to answer this question, we have to give some sense to the phrase, All men (human beings) are created equal. Human beings are manifestly not equal, differing greatly in intelligence, virtue and capacities. In virtue of what can the claim to equality be made? It is Singers contention that claims to equality do not rest on factual equality. Not only do human beings differ in their capacities, but it might even turn out that intelligence, the capacity for virtue, etc. are not distributed evenly among the races and sexes: The appropriate response to those who claim to have found evidence of genetically based differences in ability between the races or sexes is not to stick to the belief that the genetic explanation must be wrong, whatever evidence to the contrary may turn up; instead we should make it quite clear that the claim to equality does not depend on intelligence, moral capacity, physical strength, o r similar matters of fact. Equality is a moral ideal, not a simple assertion of fact. There is no logically compelling reason for assuming that a factual difference in ability between two people justifies any difference in the amount of consideration we give to satisfying their needs and interests. The principle of equality of human beings is not a description of an alleged actual equality among humans: it is a prescription of how we should treat humans. 2 In so far as the subject is human equality, Singers view is supported by other philosophers. Bernard Williams, for example, is concerned to show that demands for equality cannot rest on factual equality among people, for no such equality exists. 3 The only respect in which all men are equal, according to Williams, is that they are all equally men. This seems to be a platitude, but Williams denies that it is trivial. Membership in the species homo sapiens in itself has no special moral significance, but rather the fact that all men are human serves as a reminder that being human involves the possession of characteristics that are morally relevant. But on what characteristics does Williams focus? Aside from the desire for self-respect (which I will discuss later), Williams is not concerned with uniquely human capacities. Rather, he focuses on the capacity to feel pain and the 2 Singer, 5. BernardWilliams, The Idea of Equality, Philosophy,Politics and Society I962), 3 (Second Series), Laslett and Runciman (eds. ) (Blackwell, printed in Moral Concepts, Feinberg (ed. ) (Oxford, I970), 153-17I. 248 IIo0-I3, re- Discussion capacityto feel affection. It is in virtue of these capacities,it seems, that the idea of equalityis to be justified. ApparentlyRichardWasserstromhas the same idea as he sets out the racistslogicaland moral mistakesin Rights, Human Rights and Racial Discrimination. 4 The racist fails to acknowledgethat the black person is as capable of sufferingas the white person. According to Wasserstrom, the reason why a person is said to have a right not to be made to suffer acute physicalpain is that we all do in fact value freedomfrom such pain. Therefore, if anyone has a right to be free from sufferingacute physical has pain, everyone this right,for thereis no possiblebasisof discrimination. Wasserstromsays, For, if all persons do have equal capacitiesof these sorts and if the existence of these capacitiesis the reason for ascribing these rights to anyone, then all persons ought to have the right to claim equality of treatmentin respect to the possession and exercise of these rights. 5The basis of equality, for Wasserstromas for Williams,lies not in some uniquely human capacity,but ratherin the fact that all human beings are alikein their capacityto suffer. Writerson equalityhave focused on this capacity,I think,becauseit functionsas some sortof lowestcommon denominator,so that whateverthe other capacitiesof a human being, he is entitledto equal consideration because,like everyoneelse, he is capable of suffering. If the capacityto suffer is the reason for ascribinga right to freedom from acute pain, or a right to well being, then it certainlylooks as though these rights must be extended to animalsas well. This is the conclusion Singer arrives at. The demand for human equality rests on the equal capacityof all human beings to sufferand to enjoy well being. But if this is the basis of the demandfor equality,then this demandmust include all beings which have an equal capacityto suffer and enjoy well being. That is why Singer places at the basis of the demandfor equality, not intelligence or reason, but sentience. And equality will mean, not equality of of treatment,but equal consideration interests. The equal consideration mean quite differenttreatment,dependingon the of interests will often natureof the entity being considered. It would be as absurdto talk of a dogs right to vote, Singer says, as to talk of a mans right to have an abortion. ) It might be thought that the issue of equality depends on a discussion of rights. Accordingto this line of thought, animals do not merit equal considerationof interests because, unlike human beings, they do not, or cannot, have rights. But I am not going to discuss rights, important as 6i, Journalof Philosophy No. 20 (I964), reprintedin HumanRights,A. I. Melden (ed. ) (Wadsworth,I970), 96-110. Ibid. , Io6. 249 4 Richard Wasserstrom, Rights,HumanRights,and RacialDiscrimination, Discussion the issue is. The fact that an entity does not have rights does not necessarily imply that its interests are going to count for less than the interests of entities which are right-bearers. According to the view of rights held by H. L. A. Hart and S. I. Benn, infants do not have rights, nor do the mentally defective, nor do the insane, in so far as they all lack certain minimal conceptual capabilities for having rights. Yet it certainly does not seem that either Hart or Benn would agree that therefore their interests are to be counted for less, or that it is morally permissible to treat them in ways in which it would not be permissible to treat right-bearers. It seems to mean only that we must give different sorts of reasons for our obligations to take into consideration the interests of those who do not have rights. We have reasons concerning the treatment of other people which are clearly independent of the notion of rights. We would say that it is wrong to punch someone because doing that infringes his rights. But we could also say that it is wrong because doing that hurts him, and that is, ordinarily, enough of a reason not to do it. Now this particular reason extends not only to human beings, but to all sentient creatures. One has a prima facie reason not to pull the cats tail (whether or not the cat has rights) because it hurts the cat. And this is the only thing, normally, which is relevant in this case. The fact that the cat is not a rational being, that it is not capable of moral responsibility, that it cannot make free choices or shape its lifeall of these differences from us have nothing to do with the justifiability of pulling its tail. Does this show that rationality and the rest of it are irrelevant to moral treatment? I hope to show that this is not the case. But first I want to point out that the issue is not one of cruelty to animals. We all agree that cruelty is wrong, whether perpetrated on a moral or non-moral, rationalor non-rational agent. Cruelty is defined as the infliction of unnecessary pain or suffering. What is to count as necessary or unnecessary is determined, in part, by the nature of the end pursued. Torturing an animal is cruel, because although the pain is logically necessary for the action to be torture, the end (deriving enjoyment from seeing the animal suffer) is monstrous. Allowing animals to suffer from neglect or for the sake of large profits may also be thought to be unnecessary and therefore cruel. But there may be some ends, which are very good (such as the advancement of medical knowledge), which can be accomplished by subjecting animals to pain in experiments. Although most people would agree that the pain inflicted on animals used in medical research ought to be kept to a minimum, they would consider pain that cannot be eliminated necessary and therefore not cruel. It would probably not be so regarded if the subjects were non6 H. L. A. Hart, Are There Any Natural Rights? , Philosophical Review 64 (1955), and S. I. Benn, Abortion,Infanticide, and Respect for Persons, The Problem of Abortion, Feinberg (ed. (Wadsworth, I973), 92-104. 250 Discussion voluntary human beings. Necessity, then, is defined in terms of human benefit, but this is just what is being called into question. The topic of cruelty to animals, while important from a practical viewpoint, because much of our present treatment of animals involves the infliction of suffering for no good reason, is not very interes ting philosophically. What is philosophically interesting is whether we are justified in having different standards of necessity for human suffering and for animal suffering. Singer says, quite rightly I think, If a being suffers, there can be no moral justification for refusing to take that suffering into consideration. 7 But he thinks that the principle of equality requires that, no matter what the nature of the being, its suffering be counted equally with the like suffering of any other being. In other words sentience does not simply provide us with reasons for acting; it is the only relevant consideration for equal consideration of interests. It is this view that I wish to challenge. I want to challenge it partly because it has such counter-intuitive results. It means, for example, that feeding starving children before feeding starving dogs is just like a Catholic charitys feeding hungry Catholics before feeding hungry non-Catholics. It is simply a matter of taking care of ones own, something which is usually morally permissible. But whereas we would admire the Catholic agency which did not discriminate, but fed all children, first come, first served, we would feel quite differently about someone who had this policy for dogs and children. Nor is this, it seems to me, simply a matter of a sentimental preference for our own species. I might feel much more love for my dog than for a strange child-and yet I might feel morally obliged to feed the child before I fed my dog. If I gave in to the feelings of love and fed my dog and let the child go hungry, I would probably feel guilty. This is not to say that we can simply rely on such feelings. Huck Finn felt guilty at helping Jim escape, which he viewed as stealing from a woman who had never done him any harm. But while the existence of such feelings does not settle the morality of an issue, it is not clear to me that they can be explained away. In any event, their existence can serve as a motivation for trying to find a rational justification for considering human interests above non-human ones. However, it does seem to me that this requires a justification. Until now, common sense (and academic philosophy) have seen no such need. Benn says, No one claims equal consideration for all mammals-human beings count, mice do not, though it would not be easy to say why not. Although we hesitate to inflict unnecessary pain on sentient creatures, such as mice or dogs, we are quite sure that we do not need to show good reasons for putting human interests before theirs. 8 7 Singer, 9. 8 Benn, 3, of Equality,Moral and Social, The Encyclopedia Philosophy 40. 251 Discussion I think we do have to justify counting our interests more heavily than those of animals. But how? Singer is right, I think, to point out that it will not do to refer vaguely to the greater value of human life, to human worth and dignity: Faced with a situation in which they see a need for some basis for the moral gulf that is commonly thought to separate humans and animals, but can find no concrete difference that will do this without undermining the equality of humans, philosophers tend to waffle. They resort to high-sounding phrases like the intrinsic dignity of the human individual. They talk of the intrinsic worth of all men as if men had some worth that other beings do not have or they say that human beings, and only human beings, are ends in themselves, while everything other than a person can only have value for a person. Why should we not attribute intrinsic dignity or intrinsic worth to ourselves? Why should we not say that we are the only things in the universe that have intrinsic value? Our fellow human beings are unlikely to reject the accolades we so generously bestow upon them, and those to whom we deny the honour are unable to object. 9 Singer is right to be sceptical of terms like intrinsic dignity and intrinsic worth. These phrases are no substitute for a moral argument. But they may point to one. In trying to understand what is meant by these phrases, we may find a difference or differences between human beings and non-human animals that will justify different treatment while not undermining claims for human equality. While we are not compelled to discriminate among people because of different capacities, if we can find a significant difference in capacities between human and non-human animals, this could serve to justify regarding human interests as primary. It is not arbitrary or smug, I think, to maintain that human beings have a different moral status from members of other species because of certain capacities which are characteristic of being human. We may not all be equal in these capacities, but all human beings possess them to some measure, and non-human animals do not. For example, human beings are normally held to be responsible for what they do. In recognizing that someone is responsible for his or her actions, you accord that person a respect which is reserved for those possessed of moral autonomy, or capable of achieving such autonomy. Secondly, human beings can be expected to reciprocate in a way that non-human animals cannot. Nonhuman animals cannot be motivated by altruistic or moral reasons; they cannot treat you fairly or unfairly. This does not rule out the possibility of an animal being motivated by sympathy or pity. It does rule out altruistic motivation in the sense of motivation due to the recognition that the 9 Singer, 266-267. 52 Discussion needs and interestsof othersprovideone with certainreasonsfor acting. 10 Human beings are capable of altruisticmotivationin this sense. We are sometimes motivated simply by the recognitionthat someone else is in pain, and that pain is a bad thing, no matterwho suffersit. It is this sort of reasonthat I claimcannotmotivatean animalor any entitynot possessed of fairly abstract concepts. (If some non-humananimals do possess the requisiteconcepts-perhaps chimpanzeeswho have learneda languagethey might well be capableof altruisticmotivation. This means that our moral dealingswith animalsare necessarilymuch more limited than our dealings with other human beings. If rats invade our houses, carrying disease and biting our children, we cannot reason with them, hoping to persuadethem of the injustice they do us. We can only attempt to get for rid of them. And it is this that makesit reasonable us to accordthem a and not equal moral status, even though their capacityto suffer separate providesus with some reason to kill them painlessly,if this can be done without too much sacrifice of human interests. Thirdly, as Williams points out, there is the desire for self-respect: a certain human desire to be identifiedwith what one is doing, to be able to realize purposesof ones own, and not to be the instrumentof anotherswill unless one has willingly accepted such a role. 11Some animalsmay have some form of this desire, and to the extent that they do, we ought to consider their interest in freedom and self-determination. (Such considerationsmight affect our attitudes toward zoos and circuses. But the desire for selfrespectper se requiresthe intellectualcapacitiesof humanbeings, and this desireprovidesus with specialreasonsnot to treathumanbeings in certain ways. It is an affrontto the dignity of a human being to be a slave (even if a well-treatedone); this cannot be true for a horse or a cow. To point this out is of course only to say that the justificationfor the treatmentof an entity will dependon the sort of entity in question. In our treatmentof other entities, we must considerthe des ire for autonomy,dignity and respect, but only where such a desire exists. Recognitionof differentdesires and interestswill often requiredifferenttreatment,a point Singer himself makes. But is the issue simply one of differentdesires and interestsjustifying and requiringdifferenttreatment? I would like to make a strongerclaim, namely,that certaincapacities,which seem to be unique to humanbeings, entitle their possessorsto a privilegedposition in the moral community. Both rats and human beings dislike pain, and so we have a primafacie reasonnot to inflict pain on either. But if we can free human beings from which involves cripplingdiseases,pain and deaththroughexperimentation The Possibilityof Altruism(Oxford, 1970). 11Williams,op. cit. , I57. 10This conceptionof altruisticmotivationcomes from Thomas Nagels 253 Discussion making animals suffer, and if this is the only way to achieve such results, then I think that such experimentation is justified because human lives are more valuable than animal lives. And this is because of certain capacities and abilities that normal human beings have which animals apparently do not, and which human beings cannot exercise if they are devastated by pain or disease. My point is not that the lack of the sorts of capacities I have been discussing gives us a justification for treating animals just as we like, but rather that it is these differences between human beings and non-human animals which provide a rational basis for different moral treatment and consideration. Singer focuses on sentience alone as the basis of equality, but we can justify the belief that human beings have a moral worth that non-human animals do not, in virtue of specific capacities, and without resorting to high-sounding phrases. Singer thinks that intelligence, the capacity for moral responsibility, for virtue, etc. are irrelevant to equality, because we would not accept a hierarchy based on intelligence any more than one based on race. We do not think that those with greater capacities ought to have their interests weighed more heavily than those with lesser capacities, and this, he thinks, shows that differences in such capacities are irrelevant to equality. But it does not show this at all. Kevin Donaghy argues (rightly, I think) that what entitles us human beings to a privileged position in the moral community is a certain minimal level of intelligence, which is a prerequisite for morally relevant capacities. 2 The fact that we would reject a hierarchical society based on degree of intelligence does not show that a minimal level of intelligence cannot be used as a cut-off point, justifying giving greater consideration to the interests of those entities which meet this standard. Interestingly enough, Singer concedes the rationality of valuing the lives of normal human beings over the lives of non-human animals. 13 We are not required to value equally the life of a normal human being and the life of an animal, he thinks, but only their suffering. But I doubt that the value of an entitys life can be separated from the value of its suffering in this way. If we value the lives of human beings more than the lives of animals, this is because we value certain capacities that human beings have and animals do not. But freedom from suffering is, in general, a minimal condition for exercising these capacities, for living a fully human life. So, valuing human life more involves regarding human interests as counting for more. That is why we regard human suffering as more deplorable than comparable animal suffering. 12 Kevin Donaghy, Singer on Speciesism, PhilosophicExchange(Summer 1974). 13 Singer, 22. 254 Discussion But there is one point of Singers which I have not yet met. Some human beings (if only a very few) are less intelligent than some nonhuman animals. Some have less capacity for moral choice and responsibility. What status in the moral community are these members of our species to occupy? Are their interests to be considered equally with ours? Is experimenting on them permissible where such experiments are painful or injurious, but somehow necessary for human well being? If it is certain of our capacities which entitle us to a privileged position, it looks as if those lacking those capacities are not entitled to a privileged position. To think it is justifiable to experiment on an adult chimpanzee but not on a severely mentally incapacitated human being seems to be focusing on membership in a species where that has no moral relevance. (It is being speciesist in a perfectly reasonable use of the word. ) How are we to meet this challenge? Donaghy is untroubled by this objection. He says that it is fully in accord with his intuitions, that he regards the killing of a normally intelligent human being as far more serious than the killing of a person so severely limited that he lacked the intellectual capacities of an adult pig. But this parry really misses the point. The question is whether Donaghy thinks that the killing of a human being so severely limited that he lacked the intellectual capacities of an adult pig would be less serious than the killing of that pig. If superior intelligence is what justifies privileged status in the moral community, then the pig who is smarter than a human being ought to have superior moral status. And I doubt that this is fully in accord with Donaghys intuitions. I doubt that anyone will be able to come up with a concrete and morally relevant difference that would justify, say, using a chimpanzee in an experiment rather than a human being with less capacity for reasoning, moral responsibility, etc. Should we then experiment on the severely retarded? Utilitarian considerations aside (the difficulty of comparing intelligence between species, for example), we feel a special obligation to care for the handicapped members of our own species, who cannot survive in this world without such care. Non-human animals manage very well, despite their lower intelligence and lesser capacities; most of them do not require special care from us. This does not, of course, justify experimenting on them. However, to subject to experimentation those people who depend on us seems even worse than subjecting members of other species to it. In addition, when we consider the severely retarded, we think, That could be me. It makes sense to think that one might have been born retarded, but not to think that one might have been born a monkey. And so, although one can imagine oneself in the monkeys place, one feels a closer identification with the severely retarded human being. Here we are getting away from such things as morally relevant differences and are talking about something much more difficult to articulate, namely, the role of feeling 255 Discussion and sentiment in moral thinking. We would be horrifiedby the use of the retarded in medical research. But what are we to make of this horror? Has it moral significance or is it mere sentiment, of no more import than the sentiment of whites against blacks? It is terribly difficult to know how to evaluate such feelings. 14 am not going to say more about this, because I think that the treatment of severely incapacitated human beings does not pose an insurmountable objection to the privileged status principle. I am willing to admit that my horror at the thought of experiments being performed on severely mentally incapacitated human beings in cases in which I would find it justifiable and preferable to perform the same experiments on non-human animals (capable of similar suffering) may not be a moral emotion. But it is certainly not wrong of us to extend special care to members of our own species, motivated by feelings of sympathy, protectiveness, etc. If this is speciesism, it is stripped of its tone of moral condemnation. It is not racist to provide special care to members of your own race; it is racist to fall below your moral obligation to a person because of his or her race. I have been arguing that we are morally obliged to consider the interests of all sentient creatures, but not to consider those interests equally with human interests. Nevertheless, even this recognition will mean some radical changes in our attitude toward and treatment of other species. 15 State University of New York at Albany un into the same problem when discussing abortion. Of what significance are our feelingstowardthe unbornwhen discussingits status? Is it relevant or irrelevantthat it looks like a human being? 15I would like to acknowledgethe help of, and offer thanks to, Professor RichardArneson of the University of California,San Diego; ProfessorSidney Gendin of EasternMichigan University; and ProfessorPeter Singer of Monash University, all of whom read and commentedon earlierdrafts of this paper. 256 14 We

The Misdemeanors of Well-Educated People in Public Office

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Symbolism In Trifles by susan glaspell Essay Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 750 words

Symbolism In Trifles by susan glaspell - Essay Example Wright and the situation which led to the main conflict that is throughout the play. The first set of symbols which are associated with the trifles are the kitchen items which are seen, all which are referred to first as being in a mess. The set of noticed items include fruit that has frozen, preserves that Mrs. Wright was working on and pans that are under the sink. The main association is with the fruit that is frozen and with the preserves that haven’t been cared for. This is significant as it becomes a meaning which is related to the marriage and how it wasn’t cared for or preserved. This is what led to the cold and icy relationship that both were a part of. This is followed by the pans that are kicked under the sink leave the same impression, which shows that the cooking and care is one which is stuffed into a corner and hasn’t been used properly, similar to the marriage which Mrs. Wright is in. The next item which becomes symbolic is the loaf of bread. This isn’t significant except it hasn’t been placed in the bread box, which causes it to dry quickly and isn’t a way of caring for the items in the kitchen. The loaf of bread becomes symbolic with the marriage not being set in the right place and instead becoming one based on the wrong understanding within the relationship. While the men state that this is related to bad housekeeping, the women that are speaking notice that the uncommon changes in the kitchen are related specifically to Mrs. Wright not being able to create the right approach to the idea of being a wife and having a husband which is able to care for the marriage. The clothing is another symbol which is noted. This becomes significant because of the types of clothing that is expected. The first is an apron which Mrs. Wright has requested. The apron is significant because it shows how Mrs. Wright only believes the marriage was good so she could offer housekeeping chores, as opposed to having a true mar riage. The second is a shawl that is required. There is also a quilt which is mentioned and which the women notice that she is piecing together. The statement which is made with this is based on knotting the quilt, instead of sewing it. The knots are significant with the thoughts of Mrs. Wright, which doesn’t offer a proper way of putting together the quilt but instead shows that her marriage is tied together loosely. The significance of the individual items are also identified with the state that each of the pieces are in. The sewing left behind is noted as being good half way through the piece then changing. Mrs. Hale states that â€Å"Here, this is the one that she was working on, and look at the sewing! All the rest of it has been so nice and even. And look at this! It’s all over the place! Why, it looks as if she didn’t know what she was about!† (Glaspell, 962). There are also noticed changes with half of the counter being clean and the other half be ing a mess. The concept of the items being half way clean and the other half messy continues with a hinge that is half way pulled off of the door. Each of these indicate that the marriage was one which was also becoming a mess and was falling apart, similar to the items seen. The last trifle which works as a symbol is the bird. This is significant because of the cage which is found; however, the bird is gone. The women looking at the trifles note that Mrs. Wright used to like to sing but stopped. They also note

Term Definition Paper Essay Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 1000 words

Term Definition Paper - Essay Example This paper stresses that the current economic situation affects my organization in the form of lower demands for output because of the financial crunch. While the effect is on the national scale, if not on the global scale, local organizations can feel the effect through decrease in sales due to curbing down on consumption. At times like these when there is recession, organizations face a challenge of coming up with ways in order to boost demand, despite the developing mentality of curbing down on consumption. The inflation rate is determined by the interaction of the aggregate demand—the overall level of demand in the economy, and the aggregate supply—the overall level of output producers are willing to supply in order to meet these demands. An increase or upward shift in the aggregate demand at the same level of aggregate supply causes an increase in inflation rate—also known as demand-pull inflation. This article makes a conclusion that the most important economic indicator which affects my organization is the growing inflation, which is of the cost-push variety that a lot of other countries in the whole world also experience. The cost-push inflation makes the prices of inputs higher, therefore squeezes the profit of the organization. With the challenge of lower demands, the profitability is further worsened. Therefore, my organization faces a challenge to come up with ways in order to improve profitability, either by finding ways to cut down on cost and lessen the higher prices of inputs, or boosting demand and repeat purchase among the customers.